ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
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727 detections
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Detects the execution and network activity of known tunneling, proxy, and VPN tools such as Chisel, SoftEther, and Tor based on process names, command-line arguments, file paths, and network connections.
Detects endpoint file creation, modification, process execution, and image load events where the file hash matches a known malicious hash feed from Live-Malware-DB.
Detects processes other than known browsers accessing Chromium-based credential stores, cookies, or chat/messaging app session data, correlated with Wi-Fi profile and cleartext key enumeration via netsh.exe.
Detects a sequence where an endpoint clears event logs (using wevtutil or PowerShell) and subsequently tampers with or disables security tools (such as Windows Defender or service logging) on the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects Phexia macOS stealer activity where osascript or shell processes query the macOS keychain for browser Safe Storage keys, followed by staging browser and extension data in temporary directories.
Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2021-3156 (Baron Samedit) involving the sudoedit command invoked with the shell-mode flag (-s) and a trailing backslash argument, which is a known trigger for the heap overflow vulnerability in sudo.
Detects the installation of a Google Meet-named MSI package via msiexec.exe from user-writable paths or non-Google URLs, correlated with the creation of a GoogleMeet.exe binary in the Google Meet Agent directory.
Detects the disguised binary 'Credential Guard.exe' accessing sensitive browser credential and cookie stores across common browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera), indicative of credential theft activity.
Detects HTTP requests made to specific fabricated decoy routes planted as comments in application code or documentation (SpikeStrip comments). Probing these non-existent routes indicates that an agent or adversary has ingested the planted comments and is actively scanning the web application.
Detects a potential web shell by identifying a web server or runtime process creating or modifying a script file (PHP, JS, MJS) in a web-accessible directory, followed closely by the same web server process spawning a shell or command interpreter.
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