ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
0 followers820 downloads3,277 copies25 likes12,024 views
727 detections
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Detects potential malicious software installation via two branches: Branch A identifies MSI files downloaded from suspicious URLs or with meeting/update lures (e.g., Zoom, Google Meet) followed by msiexec installation within one hour. Branch B detects msiexec command lines referencing RMM tools (ScreenConnect, LogMeIn, GoToResolve) combined with paths like Downloads, Temp, or AppData.
Detects shell command lines that download a script into a dot-prefixed file within the /tmp directory using curl or wget and subsequently execute it using a Unix shell (sh, bash, dash), similar to the Node-RED exec-node dropper variant.
Detects external source IPs probing multiple distinct web applications and paths (such as Node-RED, Apache Solr, Gitea, Joomla) while using rotating user agents, indicating potential vulnerability scanning or web reconnaissance activity.
Detects potential ESC8 NTLM relay attacks against Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment, where a domain controller machine account authenticates over NTLM from a non-DC IP address followed by a certificate request or retrieval via IIS.
Detects inbound extortion or ransom emails based on specific subject line keywords combined with urgency phrases (e.g., 3-day deadlines) or through correlation with known data leak site (DLS) domains in email URLs.
Detects inbound phishing emails delivered via Amazon SES featuring common financial or administrative lure terms (such as invoice, remittance, quarantine) where the embedded URL includes parameters containing the recipient's email address.
Detects non-browser processes communicating with both mail.google.com and api.telegram.org within a 60-minute window, which may indicate automated email exfiltration via Telegram using stolen session cookies.
Detects the process-level execution of agentic offensive tooling and servers associated with the BOSSAI report, including HexStrike, Kali MCP, HalberdStrike, and CyberStrike.
Detects machine account NTLM logons to an Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment server where the source device differs from the account's own host (indicative of NTLM coercion like PetitPotam), followed within 10 minutes by certificate enrollment requests (/certsrv/) from the same source host.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) token replay attacks (Sneaky 2FA style) where a successful interactive sign-in with multi-factor authentication is followed within 60 minutes by a successful single-factor sign-in for the same user and application from a different IP address and user agent.
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