ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
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727 detections
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Detects behavioral activity where PowerShell is used to import and link a Group Policy Object (GPO) using Import-GPO and New-GPLink alongside references to SYSVOL, or where an executable/archive is written to SYSVOL by PowerShell followed by GPO cmdlets.
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) probing attempts where unexpected schemes such as gopher, dict, or file are used within specific validation parameters, targeting internal services like Redis, Adminer, or local files.
Detects bulk deletion of Magento var/report error reports (i08*.php style files) by a web server or PHP process, which often indicates cleanup or anti-forensic actions following web shell deployment or report poisoning.
Detects instances where the FTP utility (ftp.exe) executes command shells or related utilities (such as cmd.exe) using script files containing escape characters, which is a known behavior of BITTER/PapRAT malware.
Detects SGTool.exe performing a network download from non-standard Sogou/Tencent hosts followed by dropping components such as libcef.dll, SogouComMgr.exe, or biz_helper.exe into the SogouInput o Components directory, excluding known baseline updates.
Detects behavior where SGTool.exe launches SogouComMgr.exe from the SogouInput Components directory, followed by the loading of libcef.dll from the same directory, filtering out common legitimate hashes seen across multiple endpoints.
Detects offline decryption of FortiGate configuration secrets (using fortipwkey or passwds.txt) followed within 1 day on the same device by the execution of openfortivpn or forticlient using explicit credentials.
Detects successful administrator logins or system.admin account creations on Fortinet FortiGate devices originating from external source IPs that have not been observed in the 30-day baseline for that device.
Detects registry value sets that add Windows Defender path exclusions targeting known ScreenConnect installer scripts, staged MSIs, Windows Temp directories, or RelayTrap paths, which are commonly used by threat actors for defense evasion.
Detects potential lateral movement using PsExec, identifying the installation and execution of the PsExec service (PsExecService.exe) alongside the creation of the PSEXEC named pipe on the same device within a short time window. Uses a 14-day baseline to surface new device and account pairs seen for the first time while excluding allowlisted IT admin accounts and jump hosts.
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