ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
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727 detections
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Detects a post-exploitation reconnaissance sequence executed by an update script (spawned via cmd.exe) involving registry queries for Windows product name/build and net session admin testing on the same device within a short timeframe.
Detects non-system processes initiating outbound SMB (ports 445/139) or WebDAV-style connections (ports 80/443/8080 with DavWWWRoot) to public IP addresses, correlated with NTLM logon events to external hosts, indicative of forced NTLM authentication attempts.
Detects the creation of an 'Intel_Log' directory within AppData or Application Data followed by network communication from the same process to Microsoft cloud infrastructure endpoints (login.microsoftonline.com, graph.microsoft.com, sharepoint.com) within a one-hour window, potentially indicating GraphDoor malware activity.
Detects a multi-step process execution chain associated with the BITTER threat group, where ftp.exe with a script argument spawns a command shell, which subsequently executes msiexec.exe to perform a silent install from a WebDAV SSL path.
Detects a sequence where a webshell or tunnel tool (such as Neo-reGeorg, reGeorg, or suo5) is deployed or executed, followed by credential-dumping or lateral movement tooling (such as evil-winrm, dploot, donpapi, or NetExec with SAM/LSA extraction) on the same device within a 7-day window.
Detects the creation of forged Kerberos credential cache (.ccache) files written by a process whose command line contains ticket-forging arguments (such as ticketer, -nthash, -aesKey, or -domain-sid). It also correlates whether the forged ticket is subsequently used on the same device within a short window.
Detects a behavioral chain where a script interpreter (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) launches curl.exe with specific download parameters to fetch an MSI file into the temporary directory, followed closely by msiexec.exe performing an administrative installation (/a) of the downloaded package.
Detects the ScreenConnect host client (ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe) spawning command or scripting interpreters (cmd, PowerShell, wscript) or Notepad++ to execute guest-pushed files located within the user's Temp folder.
Detects FortiOS SSL-VPN pre-auth exploitation attempts, specifically identifying path traversal patterns in /remote/fgt_lang or high-volume abnormal /remote/logincheck requests indicative of brute-force or exploitation activity.
Detects new external source IP addresses not seen in the prior 14 days connecting to FortiGate Fabric Management Protocol (FGFM) ports 541 and 542 on Fortinet devices.
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