ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
0 followers820 downloads3,277 copies25 likes12,024 views
727 detections
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Detects the creation or modification of web script files (.aspx, .jsp) within common web application directories by unusual processes (such as command shells or download utilities) or by non-standard user accounts, indicating potential web shell deployment.
Detects the execution of unapproved Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software tools followed by subsequent outbound public IP network activity from the same process on the same device, indicating an active remote session.
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by stopping the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) using utilities like net, net1, or sc, or deleting shadow copies using vssadmin.exe, excluding known backup agents.
Detects inbound emails where the sender claims to be from an internal or organization domain but has a null envelope sender address, lacks valid DKIM authentication, and does not match common legitimate automated messages (like DSNs or auto-replies), potentially indicating email spoofing or phishing attempts.
Detects anomalous activities associated with potential PHP2Shell exploitation or webshell deployment where a web server worker (such as Apache, HTTPD, or PHP) spawns a Unix shell containing suspicious utility tokens, drops a PHP file outside excluded directories, or creates a PHP session-derived file.
Detects the creation of cook.pth or cook.py in Python site-packages or dist-packages directories by package managers or interpreters, followed by a Python interpreter execution on the same device within one hour. This pattern matches the malicious supply chain behavior observed in compromised LiteLLM versions (e.g., 1.107.0) utilizing .pth auto-import chains for persistence and execution.
Detects endpoint network connections and correlates multi-stage communications associated with the ClickFix browser cache smuggling campaign, including initial payload retrieval and secondary stage/C2 communication across devices.
Detects potential C2Agent parent-spoofing behavior characterized by short-lived scheduled tasks (created and deleted within a 10-minute window with names matching c2a_<n>) or process relaunches carrying specific -fork2 command-line markers.
Detects an executable running from the C:\Windows\ directory (excluding known benign applications) that establishes two or more distinct persistence mechanisms within a short timeframe, such as scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts.
Detects a sequence where a device runs a staging/archiving utility (such as WinRAR, 7-Zip, or a copy script) followed within 4 hours by a file transfer or synchronization tool (such as rclone or FileZilla), which is indicative of data staging prior to exfiltration.
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