ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
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727 detections
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Detects a user account that performs a device code sign-in flow followed by the registration of five or more devices with deceptive names (matching patterns like microsoft- or windows-) within a one day timeframe. This behavior can indicate an adversary establishing persistence or attempting tenant resource exhaustion using compromised accounts.
Detects a potential password spraying attack characterized by multiple authentication failures across numerous users from a single IP address, followed by a successful sign-in from that same IP, culminating in a privileged role or credential change performed by the compromised account.
Detects when a USB mass storage device is connected to a host and is followed shortly thereafter by a large volume of file creations or modifications on a removable drive, which may indicate data exfiltration or staging.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Correlates a high-risk or compromised Microsoft Entra sign-in event with a subsequent device registration (Add device or Register device) performed by the same user account within a 3-hour window.
Detects script execution (such as wscript, cscript, mshta) spawned from a shell parent process (like explorer.exe or cmd.exe) referencing browser cache files (matching f_* in browser profile directories) or copying scripts to the local Temp directory as t.vbs.
Detects non-root SSH execution performing remote port forwarding (-R) targeting a Unix socket bind on hosts running the tailscaled daemon, excluding known automation tools.
Detects the correlation between the loading of known stealer plugin DLLs outside of standard application paths and subsequent process activity accessing credential stores, sensitive files, or executing wireless key recovery commands.
Detects modification or creation of .htaccess files within WordPress directory structures followed within 24 hours by the creation or modification of .cache files in the same directory. This behavioral pattern is often indicative of web shell deployment or persistence installation via compromised web applications.
Detects five or more Entra ID device registrations by a single account where device names match microsoft-* or WINDOWS-* patterns, occurring shortly after a device code flow sign-in by the same account. This behavior is indicative of device registration abuse or persistent access attempts.
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