Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
11,831 detections
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Detects the Shai-Hulud supply chain attack dead-man's switch: a gh-token-monitor persistence component followed by a recursive forced deletion of the user home directory, or the presence of the specific kill-switch string in a command line.
Sweeps network, process command-line and URL-click telemetry for the Kimsuky payload C2 domain and its subdomains using an anchored match, which avoids lookalike or suffix-matching domains.
Detects the execution of Linux encryptors or binaries via the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), utilizing tools like wsl.exe, wslhost.exe, or bash.exe with execution arguments or referencing ELF files, mount paths, and permission modifications.
Detects the execution of Linux encryptors or binaries via the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), utilizing tools like wsl.exe, wslhost.exe, or bash.exe with execution arguments or referencing ELF files, mount paths, and permission modifications.
Detects suspicious command-line execution patterns involving Unix shells (bash, zsh, sh) spawned from terminal applications where tools like curl or wget are piped directly into a shell, base64 decoding is performed, osascript executes dialogs, or quarantine attributes are removed.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects the use of msxsl.exe or wmic.exe to process .xsl or .xslt files, potentially indicating the execution of embedded scripts. The rule calculates a risk score based on the combination of the utility name, the presence of an XSL/XSLT file reference in the command line, usage of suspicious file paths (e.g., Temp, AppData), and being launched by potentially suspicious parent processes like cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
Detects an agentic AI application (e.g., Claude Code, ChatGPT Codex) directly
spawning a package manager install command (npm install / pip install). As enterprise
adoption of agentic coding and automation tools spreads beyond developer workstations into
marketing, HR, finance, and operations, these tools autonomously pull open-source packages
from npm and PyPI on behalf of non-developer users. CrowdStrike reports poisoned packages
(e.g., 131 AI framework packages by STARDUST CHOLLIMA, 300+ dependencies in a single day by
ALTERED SPIDER) are increasingly pulled into environments this way, giving adversaries a path
to endpoints that never had traditional developer tooling scrutiny.
spawning a package manager install command (npm install / pip install). As enterprise
adoption of agentic coding and automation tools spreads beyond developer workstations into
marketing, HR, finance, and operations, these tools autonomously pull open-source packages
from npm and PyPI on behalf of non-developer users. CrowdStrike reports poisoned packages
(e.g., 131 AI framework packages by STARDUST CHOLLIMA, 300+ dependencies in a single day by
ALTERED SPIDER) are increasingly pulled into environments this way, giving adversaries a path
to endpoints that never had traditional developer tooling scrutiny.
The following analytic detects the behavior of dumping credentials from memory by exploiting the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) using the comsvcs.dll and MiniDump via rundll32. This detection leverages process information from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs, focusing on specific command-line executions. This activity is significant because it indicates potential credential theft, which can lead to broader system compromise, persistence, lateral movement, and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, leading to data theft, ransomware attacks, or other damaging outcomes.
The following analytic detects the modification of SSH Authorized Keys on Linux systems. It leverages process execution data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically monitoring commands like "bash" and "cat" interacting with "authorized_keys" files. This activity is significant as adversaries often modify SSH Authorized Keys to establish persistent access to compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain unauthorized access, bypassing traditional authentication mechanisms and potentially leading to further exploitation or data exfiltration.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Hunts for sqlservr.exe spawning command shells or system utilities, a pattern consistent with xp_cmdshell abuse. It also flags later steps from a public intrusion write-up: certutil decoding, SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hive saves and local account or group changes.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Detects the use of vim and its siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.\nSuch behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or breaking out from restricted environments.
Detects msiexec.exe executing an MSI package named update_ms.msi
staged in ProgramData. Chaos ransomware disguises this installer's properties
and filename to impersonate a legitimate Windows Update package. On execution,
a custom action (CA_Run_EA2AEBC3) loads an embedded DLL (Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3,
lib.dll) directly into memory, deploying the msaRAT payload. This rule sees
the installer execution only; the in-memory module load is not observed here
and would need a separate PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD rule.
staged in ProgramData. Chaos ransomware disguises this installer's properties
and filename to impersonate a legitimate Windows Update package. On execution,
a custom action (CA_Run_EA2AEBC3) loads an embedded DLL (Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3,
lib.dll) directly into memory, deploying the msaRAT payload. This rule sees
the installer execution only; the in-memory module load is not observed here
and would need a separate PROCESS_MODULE_LOAD rule.
Detects wmic being used to add a Microsoft Defender exclusion for a fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender" installation directory. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) runs this command via the MSFT_MpPreference WMI class before dropping the CoolClient sideloader (defender.exe) and libngs.dll into that duplicated folder, ensuring the malware is never scanned. The legitimate Windows Defender path does not contain a "Microsoft\" subfolder, making this exclusion target distinctive.
Detects schtasks.exe creating a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service" that launches defender.exe (a renamed Sangfor executable abused for DLL sideloading) with SYSTEM privileges at startup. This is the exact persistence mechanism HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) uses to relaunch the CoolClient backdoor chain from the fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender" directory on every boot.
Detects execution of the XMRig Monero cryptominer or a miner
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
Detects script-driven (curl, wget, python) outbound connections to
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
The following analytic detects the execution of ngrok.exe on a Windows operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because while ngrok is a legitimate tool for creating secure tunnels, it is increasingly used by adversaries to bypass network defenses and establish reverse proxies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate data, maintain persistence, or facilitate further attacks by tunneling traffic through the compromised system.
This rule monitors for potentially malicious use of Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) binaries. It detects the execution of common command-line tools for reconnaissance, download, or lateral movement within the WSL environment, identifies the use of WSL to execute Windows 'living-off-the-land' binaries (Lolbins), and flags the installation of WSL components.
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