Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
8,393 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,122
2,721
773
497
379
Contributors
1,502
1,474
1,085
844
510
Categories
2,689
1,317
905
813
744
Platforms
5,922
913
883
299
280
Products / Services
1,616
1,400
1,084
454
419
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,636
12,583
8,393
6,223
CVEs
29
27
16
16
15
IDS Classtypes
97
50
21
14
8
IDS Protocols
98
93
9
1
Detects a process launch whose command line both references a cron persistence path (crontab, /etc/cron.d/, /etc/crontab, /etc/cron.{hourly,daily,weekly,monthly}/, /var/spool/cron/crontabs/) and contains a download-and-execute or reverse-shell marker (curl/wget piped to a shell, /dev/tcp/ redirection, base64-decoded payload, nc -e) or installs the crontab from a file staged under /tmp/. Attackers commonly install a scheduled cron entry so a malicious command re-executes on a fixed interval, surviving reboots and process kills (T1053.003).
Detects the launch of bad-bpf style eBPF rootkit loaders (pidhide with --pid-to-hide, sudoadd with --username) executed via sudo or from an interactive shell parent, representing the userspace step that issues bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD) before tracepoint hooks go live.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Detects a sequence of events on a single device where a shell (/bin/sh, /bin/bash, etc.) is copied to a path involving /usr/bin/dbus-authd using cp or busybox, followed by changing ownership to root, and subsequently setting the SUID permission bit within a 10-minute window.
Detects the AnyDesk Linux service running as root spawning a shell process (sh, bash, dash, zsh) or executing a command associated with the AnyPwn (CVE-2025-27918) post-exploitation behavior.
Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures
Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of antivirus software suchas McAfee, Symantec...etc
Lists accounts that still sign in successfully with Authenticated SMTP over the last 30 days. Microsoft plans to disable Basic auth for SMTP AUTH by default for existing tenants at the end of December 2026.
Rows come from SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, grouped per account with source IP count, apps and first and last seen.
Triage: Find the owner of each account, then move the sender to OAuth or a mail relay before the change. Inventory query, not an alert.
Limitations: Covers only sign-ins that reach the logs. Cross check with the Exchange admin center SMTP AUTH Clients Submission Report, which keeps 90 days.
Rows come from SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, grouped per account with source IP count, apps and first and last seen.
Triage: Find the owner of each account, then move the sender to OAuth or a mail relay before the change. Inventory query, not an alert.
Limitations: Covers only sign-ins that reach the logs. Cross check with the Exchange admin center SMTP AUTH Clients Submission Report, which keeps 90 days.
Detects external inbound FortiGate Fabric Management Protocol (FGFM) traffic on TCP port 541 followed by a FortiGateCloud administrative configuration download, backup, or running-config event on the same FortiGate device within a one-hour window, potentially indicating unauthorized configuration access or device compromise.
Detects hosts exhibiting multiple persistence mechanisms (Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, and Windows Services) within a short timeframe, indicating potential adversary persistence setup.
Detects the creation of persistence artifacts associated with the 'gh-token-monitor' service utilized by the Shai-Hulud worm across Linux systemd user services, macOS LaunchAgents, and Windows scheduled tasks or local application directories. This service acts as a dead-man's switch designed to wipe the user's home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked.
Detects creation of Windows registry hive files (ntuser.dat or UsrClass.dat) outside the expected user profile path hierarchy. LegacyHive writes a modified ntuser.dat to a GUID-named staging directory at C:\\ root (e.g. C:\\{GUID}\\ntuser.dat) and copies UsrClass.dat there as well to set up the oplock-based race condition. Any hive file materialising outside C:\\Users\\ or C:\\Windows\\ is a strong indicator of this exploit chain or equivalent offline hive manipulation.
Detects creation or modification of cron entries on the BeyondTrust
Remote Support / Privileged Remote Access appliance. After exploiting the pre-auth
vulnerability, attackers establish recurring execution for persistence and C2
beaconing via cron (T1053.003) on the Linux-based appliance.
Follows CISA's urgent patch advisory for BeyondTrust appliances.
Remote Support / Privileged Remote Access appliance. After exploiting the pre-auth
vulnerability, attackers establish recurring execution for persistence and C2
beaconing via cron (T1053.003) on the Linux-based appliance.
Follows CISA's urgent patch advisory for BeyondTrust appliances.
Detects Play-style lateral movement via Group Policy: an executable (.exe/.dll) written to a SYSVOL/GPO path by the same non-machine account that modified a GPO in the same 30-minute window. Attackers use this to push ransomware or Cobalt Strike/SystemBC payloads domain-wide.
The following analytic detects "cldapi.dll" being loaded by a process not associated with legitimate cloud sync activity.
The Windows Cloud Files API (cldapi.dll) is abused by several local privilege escalation exploits.
The Windows Cloud Files API (cldapi.dll) is abused by several local privilege escalation exploits.
Detects process execution where a shell (such as bash, zsh, cmd, or powershell) is spawned by a skill or openclaw process, and subsequently performs download activities (e.g., using curl, wget, invoke-webrequest) or establishes persistence (e.g., via cron, systemd, registry run keys, schtasks).
Detects successful Google Workspace logins from an IP address or user agent not previously seen for the user within a 24-hour window.
Detects a role change in Zendesk. An administrator can read every ticket, export
data, alter automations and add agents — and support platforms are a favoured
target for social engineering precisely because agents are trained to be helpful to
strangers.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='USER_UPDATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role
data, alter automations and add agents — and support platforms are a favoured
target for social engineering precisely because agents are trained to be helpful to
strangers.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='USER_UPDATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role
Detects authentication to the BIG-IP management interface. These interfaces should
be reachable only from a management network; a login from anywhere else indicates
either an exposure that should not exist or an attacker who has already reached the
management plane.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
be reachable only from a management network; a login from anywhere else indicates
either an exposure that should not exist or an attacker who has already reached the
management plane.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects a role change on the Mimecast platform. A gateway administrator can read
quarantined mail, release held messages and alter policy — so this grant provides
both access to content and the ability to control what the organisation receives.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='ROLE_UPDATED'
| groupby user, srcip, reason
quarantined mail, release held messages and alter policy — so this grant provides
both access to content and the ability to control what the organisation receives.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='ROLE_UPDATED'
| groupby user, srcip, reason
Detects modification of a monitored file on a Centrify-managed Linux host. File
integrity events on Unix servers catch tampering with configuration, authorised keys
and service definitions — the common Linux persistence routes, which leave no
registry trace and no Windows-style artefact.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='FILE_MODIFIED'
| groupby user, targetuser, domain
integrity events on Unix servers catch tampering with configuration, authorised keys
and service definitions — the common Linux persistence routes, which leave no
registry trace and no Windows-style artefact.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='FILE_MODIFIED'
| groupby user, targetuser, domain
Page 7 of 400