Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Windows Terminal or related console hosts spawning PowerShell or PowerShell Core with command-line arguments indicative of staging, downloading, or executing remote scripts (such as encoded commands, Invoke-Expression, or web requests), commonly associated with ClickFix or social engineering techniques.
The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes mapped to the Endpoint data model. We then compare with with a list of known remote access software shipped as a lookup file - remote_access_software. This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
Detects PHP script execution interacting with the Microsoft Exchange Web Services (EWS) API, which may indicate web shell usage, email collection, or exfiltration activity.
Detects the execution of the hacktool Defendnot. Defendnot is a hacktool that abuses Microsoft undocumented WSC (Windows Security Center) API
to disable Windows Defender by registering itself as a fake antivirus product. Threat actors often use these kind of tools to bypass security measures.
to disable Windows Defender by registering itself as a fake antivirus product. Threat actors often use these kind of tools to bypass security measures.
Detects mshta.exe executing a remote HTA payload over HTTP/HTTPS, the initial fileless execution stage of ACR Stealer's Campaign 2. The retrieved HTA contains VBScript loaders that ultimately deploy obfuscated PowerShell and steganography-assisted in-memory shellcode.
Detects Java processes spawning PowerShell or Command Prompt to modify Windows Defender settings by adding exclusions for sensitive paths or extensions (such as AppData, Temp, Users Public, or ProgramData).
Detects the loading of the 'truesight.sys' driver from non-standard or temporary locations. This activity is associated with a campaign where threat actors use a vulnerable version of this driver to terminate security products before deploying ransomware or RATs, a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).
The following analytic detects the execution of processes with file or code signing attributes from known remote access software within the environment. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 data and cross-references a lookup table of remote access utilities such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use these tools to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the network.
The following analytic detects the creation of files associated with the NirSoft tool bundles on Windows endpoints.
NirSoft is a well-known provider of free, portable utilities that can be used for various system and network tasks. However, threat actors often leverage these tools for malicious purposes, such as credential harvesting, network reconnaissance, and data exfiltration.
The detection focuses on the creation of specific NirSoft tool bundle files, which may indicate that an attacker is preparing to use these utilities on a compromised system.
Security teams should investigate any instances of these files being created, especially if they are found in unexpected locations or on systems that should not be using such tools.
NirSoft is a well-known provider of free, portable utilities that can be used for various system and network tasks. However, threat actors often leverage these tools for malicious purposes, such as credential harvesting, network reconnaissance, and data exfiltration.
The detection focuses on the creation of specific NirSoft tool bundle files, which may indicate that an attacker is preparing to use these utilities on a compromised system.
Security teams should investigate any instances of these files being created, especially if they are found in unexpected locations or on systems that should not be using such tools.
Detects the creation of the "PSScriptPolicyTest" PowerShell script by an uncommon process. This file is usually generated by Microsoft Powershell to test against Applocker.
Detects process access requests to LSASS process with potentially suspicious access flags
Detects dropped files with double extensions, which is often used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that Windows hide default extensions by default.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of antivirus software suchas McAfee, Symantec...etc
The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process creating an alternate stream in the temp directory. It leverages Sysmon EventID 15 to identify these actions.
This activity is significant because wermgr.exe is typically associated with error reporting, not file creation. Such activity is significant as it may indicate RoguePlanet malware, which creates an alternate stream in the temp directory to execute malicious code.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or system compromise.
This activity is significant because wermgr.exe is typically associated with error reporting, not file creation. Such activity is significant as it may indicate RoguePlanet malware, which creates an alternate stream in the temp directory to execute malicious code.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or system compromise.
Detects the usage of command-line flags in AI coding assistant CLIs (such as Claude Code, Amazon Q CLI, and others) that intentionally skip security permissions, bypass approvals, or disable sandbox protections. The rule identifies potential developer activity that may inadvertently reduce the security posture of the development environment.
Detects the sequential relationship of data staging using tools like WinRAR and subsequent exfiltration using tools like Rclone, WinSCP, or FileZilla on a single host within a 24-hour window.
Detects PowerShell processes spawned by common managed file transfer (MFT) or web service processes (such as Serv-U, GoAnywhere, MOVEit, Cleo, Tomcat, etc.) performing remote system discovery or ingress tool transfer activities.
Detects the execution of archiving utilities (7z, rar, tar, or Compress-Archive) targeting configuration directories of AI coding assistants such as Claude, Codex, Cursor, and Gemini.
The following analytic detects when a known remote access software is added to common persistence locations on a device within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
Detects suspicious command-line execution patterns involving 'ccmpwn', coercing features, or manipulation of Configuration Manager configuration files such as SCNotification.exe.config.
Detects hosts exhibiting multiple persistence mechanisms (Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, and Windows Services) within a short timeframe, indicating potential adversary persistence setup.
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