Siddhant Mishra
@SiddhantMumbaiCompletionist
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159 detections
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Detects a privileged session launched from Secret Server. The launch is the moment
privileged access begins, and it carries the identity, the target and the source
address together — a cleaner attribution point than anything the target system will
record about a shared administrative account.
Onboarding: SECRET-SERVER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 844).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=secretserver-secret where sourcename='SECRET-SERVER' and action='LAUNCHED'
| groupby user, file, filetype, srcip
privileged access begins, and it carries the identity, the target and the source
address together — a cleaner attribution point than anything the target system will
record about a shared administrative account.
Onboarding: SECRET-SERVER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 844).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=secretserver-secret where sourcename='SECRET-SERVER' and action='LAUNCHED'
| groupby user, file, filetype, srcip
Detects a source generating blocked packets across many destination ports. Branch
edge firewalls see lateral scanning between sites that a central firewall never
observes, because that traffic does not traverse the core.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='PACKET_BLOCKED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
edge firewalls see lateral scanning between sites that a central firewall never
observes, because that traffic does not traverse the core.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='PACKET_BLOCKED'
| duration 10m
| groupby srcip
| select srcip, distinct_count(dstport)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
Detects creation of an Atlassian API token. Tokens authenticate without a password
and without multi-factor, and they persist until revoked — which makes token creation
one of the most durable persistence mechanisms available on a SaaS platform holding
an organisation's project and documentation estate.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='API_TOKEN_CREATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, sitename, domain
and without multi-factor, and they persist until revoked — which makes token creation
one of the most durable persistence mechanisms available on a SaaS platform holding
an organisation's project and documentation estate.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='API_TOKEN_CREATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, sitename, domain
Detects a threat raised by Versa Networks on a zero trust session. Versa sits at the
branch edge, so it observes traffic from sites that frequently have no local
security stack at all — in many estates it is the only sensor between a remote
office and the internet.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, srcip, dstip, threat, process
branch edge, so it observes traffic from sites that frequently have no local
security stack at all — in many estates it is the only sensor between a remote
office and the internet.
Onboarding: VERSA-NETWORKS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 806).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='VERSA-NETWORKS' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, srcip, dstip, threat, process
Detects a privileged command run through Centrify on Linux. Because elevation is
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
Detects a privilege change within an Atlassian site. Confluence and Jira hold
architecture documentation, runbooks, credentials pasted into tickets and project
plans — so a privilege escalation here is a documentation-estate compromise, which
typically precedes a far more targeted attack elsewhere.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, sitename
architecture documentation, runbooks, credentials pasted into tickets and project
plans — so a privilege escalation here is a documentation-estate compromise, which
typically precedes a far more targeted attack elsewhere.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, sitename
Detects quarantined messages being released at volume. Release overrides the
gateway's own verdict, so a burst of releases either reflects a false positive wave
or an attacker with administrative access letting their own delivery through the
control that stopped it.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='EMAIL_QUARANTINED'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender, recipient, direction
gateway's own verdict, so a burst of releases either reflects a false positive wave
or an attacker with administrative access letting their own delivery through the
control that stopped it.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='EMAIL_QUARANTINED'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender, recipient, direction
Detects deletion of a role in Centrify for Windows. Removing a role can strip access
from legitimate administrators during an incident, and it also erases the record of
who was entitled to what — which complicates reconstructing the access position
afterwards.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS' and action='ROLE_DELETED'
| groupby user, role, targetuser, domain
from legitimate administrators during an incident, and it also erases the record of
who was entitled to what — which complicates reconstructing the access position
afterwards.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS' and action='ROLE_DELETED'
| groupby user, role, targetuser, domain
Detects one account viewing many secrets in a short period. Normal privileged work
touches one or two; sweeping the vault is harvesting, and it is the single most
valuable action available to an attacker who reaches a PAM platform.
Onboarding: SECRET-SERVER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 844).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=secretserver-secret where sourcename='SECRET-SERVER' and action='VIEWED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 10
touches one or two; sweeping the vault is harvesting, and it is the single most
valuable action available to an attacker who reaches a PAM platform.
Onboarding: SECRET-SERVER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 844).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=secretserver-secret where sourcename='SECRET-SERVER' and action='VIEWED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 10
Detects export of the Atlassian audit log. An export hands over the full record of
who did what across the tenant, which is reconnaissance of the administrative
landscape and, in the wrong hands, a map of which accounts are worth targeting.
Rare enough in normal operation that each occurrence can be confirmed individually.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='AUDIT_LOG_EXPORTED'
| groupby user, sitename, domain
who did what across the tenant, which is reconnaissance of the administrative
landscape and, in the wrong hands, a map of which accounts are worth targeting.
Rare enough in normal operation that each occurrence can be confirmed individually.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='AUDIT_LOG_EXPORTED'
| groupby user, sitename, domain
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