Siddhant Mishra
@SiddhantMumbaiCompletionist
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159 detections
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Detects repositories being downloaded. Source code is intellectual property and
frequently contains embedded secrets, infrastructure detail and the logic of the
security controls themselves. Bulk download by one actor is the clearest signal of
code theft, whether by a departing engineer or a compromised account.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='REPOSITORY_DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby target
| select target, distinct_count(repositoryid)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
frequently contains embedded secrets, infrastructure detail and the logic of the
security controls themselves. Bulk download by one actor is the clearest signal of
code theft, whether by a departing engineer or a compromised account.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='REPOSITORY_DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby target
| select target, distinct_count(repositoryid)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
Detects modification of user account attributes in Active Directory. Attribute
changes are how durable access is engineered quietly: disabling pre-authentication,
setting a service principal name, or clearing password expiry each weaken an account
without creating a new one for anybody to notice.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='USER_ACCOUNT_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, accountdomain, category, role
changes are how durable access is engineered quietly: disabling pre-authentication,
setting a service principal name, or clearing password expiry each weaken an account
without creating a new one for anybody to notice.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='USER_ACCOUNT_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, accountdomain, category, role
Detects a message having its recipient altered during processing. Recipient
rewriting redirects mail away from its intended reader, and is a quiet way to
intercept correspondence or to suppress a notification that would otherwise reveal
an ongoing compromise.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI'
and action='EMAIL_RECIPIENT_CHANGED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
rewriting redirects mail away from its intended reader, and is a quiet way to
intercept correspondence or to suppress a notification that would otherwise reveal
an ongoing compromise.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI'
and action='EMAIL_RECIPIENT_CHANGED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
Detects access to directory service objects. Bulk reads of directory objects are how
an attacker maps the domain — users, groups, trusts, service principals — before
deciding what to target. It is read-only activity, which means nothing breaks and
nothing else is likely to alert.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='DIRECTORY_SERVICE_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, objectclass, objecttype, domain
an attacker maps the domain — users, groups, trusts, service principals — before
deciding what to target. It is read-only activity, which means nothing breaks and
nothing else is likely to alert.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='DIRECTORY_SERVICE_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, objectclass, objecttype, domain
Detects one account retrieving an unusually high number of distinct privileged
credentials in a short window. Legitimate privileged work involves one or two
checkouts for a specific task; sweeping the vault is what an attacker does after
compromising a PAM operator account, to harvest as much as possible before the
access is noticed.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='PAM360' and action='PASSWORD_RETRIEVED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user
| select user, distinct_count(targetuser)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 10
credentials in a short window. Legitimate privileged work involves one or two
checkouts for a specific task; sweeping the vault is what an attacker does after
compromising a PAM operator account, to harvest as much as possible before the
access is noticed.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='PAM360' and action='PASSWORD_RETRIEVED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user
| select user, distinct_count(targetuser)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 10
Detects a CyberArk threat event carrying command-line content from a privileged
session. The platform flags the session as suspicious and simultaneously records what
was typed, which gives an unusually direct view of attacker behaviour inside a
privileged context.
Review the command line in full before judging severity; PAM sessions legitimately
carry administrative commands that look alarming out of context.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and commandline != ''
| groupby user, targetuser, commandline, process, srcip
session. The platform flags the session as suspicious and simultaneously records what
was typed, which gives an unusually direct view of attacker behaviour inside a
privileged context.
Review the command line in full before judging severity; PAM sessions legitimately
carry administrative commands that look alarming out of context.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and commandline != ''
| groupby user, targetuser, commandline, process, srcip
Detects one subject line delivered to an unusually wide internal recipient set. This
is the shape of internal phishing from a compromised mailbox, which is far more
effective than external phishing because it arrives from a trusted colleague and
passes authentication checks.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE' and action='EMAIL_DELIVERED'
| duration 1h
| groupby subject, sender
| select subject, sender, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
is the shape of internal phishing from a compromised mailbox, which is far more
effective than external phishing because it arrives from a trusted colleague and
passes authentication checks.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE' and action='EMAIL_DELIVERED'
| duration 1h
| groupby subject, sender
| select subject, sender, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
Detects an endpoint or identity moving from a guest role to a corporate one. Guest
networks are deliberately segregated; a transition to corporate access means either
a legitimate onboarding or an attacker who entered through the least-controlled door
and found a way inward.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='PASSWORD_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, srcip
networks are deliberately segregated; a transition to corporate access means either
a legitimate onboarding or an attacker who entered through the least-controlled door
and found a way inward.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='PASSWORD_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, srcip
Detects a successful network admission following repeated posture compliance
failures for the same endpoint. The expected outcome of failing posture is
remediation then access; failures followed by success without remediation suggests
the check was bypassed, disabled, or satisfied by spoofed posture data.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, policy, reason, srcip
failures for the same endpoint. The expected outcome of failing posture is
remediation then access; failures followed by success without remediation suggests
the check was bypassed, disabled, or satisfied by spoofed posture data.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, policy, reason, srcip
Detects modification of ISE configuration governing who may join the network and
under what conditions. A policy change is the most efficient way to grant durable
unauthorised access: rather than defeating the control repeatedly, the attacker
rewrites it once.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='CISCO-ISE'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, policy
under what conditions. A policy change is the most efficient way to grant durable
unauthorised access: rather than defeating the control repeatedly, the attacker
rewrites it once.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='CISCO-ISE'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, policy
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